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T HAS been my uniform practice never to read from a manuscript or
use notes when I am speaking to an audience, but in speaking of
so old and dear a friend I feel a certain inhibition of emotion that
stands in the way of an adequate oral speech. Moreover, when I think
of Dean Bates' unswerving adherence to exact, accurate statement,
his abhorrence of all exaggeration, of all overstatement, I feel that he
would not he satisfied with one who followed the relatively loose
method of oral statement instead of adhering to a carefully and meticulously prepared manuscript for every word of which he could vouch.
Although I had seen Professor Bates, as he was when I first knew
him, at meetings of the section of legal education of the American
Bar Association, I think probably from 1903 on, I first began really
to know him when we both taught in the summer quarter in the
University of Chicago in 1909. It was a rather notable group who
taught in that summer quarter. There was, of course, Dean Hall of
the University of Chicago Law School; the elder Professor Burdick,
one of the best known authorities on commercial law, I suppose, in
the history of law teaching in this country; Dean Richards of the
University of Wisconsin; Professor Woodward, very well known as
a teacher at Northwestern, Stanford and later at Chicago; Professor Keedy of the University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor
Hohfeld of Stanford, who afterwards made his great reputation at
Yale; and Dean Bates and myself. It was then that I came to be
thoroughly acquainted with Dean Bates, whom it was my good fortune
to reckon as a very dear and true friend ever since. Afterward I looked forward to seeing him each year at meetings of the American Bar Associa1tion, of the Association of American Law Schools, and later, of the American Law Institute. We served together on committees in the old days
when the committee of the section of legal education of the American
Bar Association and the committees of the Association of American
Law Schools used to hold joint meetings in order to see that the
two bodies which were working for improving legal education and
raising the standards of admission to the bar cooperated and to arrange
programs so that there would be no duplication or conflict.
Also, I taught under his auspices one summer session at Michigan
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and he taught one school year under mine at Harvard. For some
years after 1916, while fundamental questions were agitating the
law school world, Dean Bates, Dean Stone of Columbia, afterwards
Mr. Justice Stone, Dean Hall of Chicago, and myself, then Dean at
Harvard, used to meet informally to discuss law school problems, feeling strongly the importance that our schools should work together
toward common ends of improving the law as well as improving legal
education, all of us agreeing to take no radical steps without notice
to the others. In this way in the period of reconstruction after the
:6.rst world war the four schools presented a united front. I should add
that Dean Bates and I served together on the committee in 1915 to
investigate the New York bar examinations as conducted tinder the
regime of Mr. Danaher. Thus I speak ·of him from nearly :fifty years
of close association in the :field to which he gave his energy and devoted
activity-legal education as a means of advancing the administration
of justice.
In the thirty-six years from the time Dean Bates in 1903 took up
law teaching as his life work till his retirement in 1939, taking the
country as a whole, much more progress was made in legal education
than had been made in two generations before. In those years in which
he was one of the chief actors, the academic law school rose to a
commanding position in professional education, the law teacher
gained a position among the leaders of the profession, cooperation
between bar associations and law teachers and the Association of
American Law Schools grew up, cooperation between law schools
and bar examiners developed, and the views of law teachers as to
the preliminary education to be required of those entering upon the
study of law came to be adopted by the profession and more and more
to be put into effect in the several states.
One who came into full time academic law teaching in 1903
found himself in a very different position from that of the beginner
in the law school of today. Not only have the conditions of legal
education and of admission to the bar put the law school in a commanding position, since to~ay the bulk of the profession and those
who make its policies come from the university law school, but the
full time teacher in the university law school of today has the con:6dence and respect of the profession where :fifty years ago he was
regarded as an impractical theorist not worth listening to. In the
greater part of the land the law teacher of today has to use up no
part of his energy arguing for good standards of admission to the bar
or for recognition of legal education conducted by full time teachers
in a full time law school or for recognition by the lawyers as one of
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themselves entitled to speak with authority on questions of law and
problems of the administration of justice. He can devote himself to
his teaching and to research and scholarly publication without having
to be continually on the defensive as to his type of school and methods
of teaching and his qualifications for teaching. I speak with assurance
here, for in September, 1903, when Dean Bates was beginning as
professor of law, I was delivering an apologetic inaugural as dean of
the Law School of the University of Nebraska where I proposed a
three year course with high entrance requirements and full time
teachers.
In the part he played in creating understanding by the bar of the
professor of law who was not a retired judge or a retired practitioner
or an active practitioner giving a fraction of his time and energy to
teaching, and no less in the part he played in making for understanding of the bar by the full time teacher who had never practiced or
had no substantial experience of practice, he was a leader.
Dean Bates deserves to be remembered in the history of legal education. Such things do not appear in the books. What was achieved
was done by his strong but attractive personality and high character,
meeting with lawyers at bar associations and making them feel that
one could be a full time university law teacher and yet a sound lawyer
and that the university law school could turn out better and more effective
practitioners than the law office or the apprentice type of school. Nor
was this all. A type of full time teacher appeared, some of them very
able men and excellent teachers, who had no interest in the practising profession, did not get admitted to the bar, and would keep the
law schools and practitioners wholly out of touch. Some of these were
not always easy to handle. But I saw Dean Bates deal with them so
understandingly and tactfully on more than one occasion in the Association of American Law Schools as to compel my admiration.
But great as was his part in putting the American university law
school in the place it now occupies, it is far from all of his achievement. His main interests were legal education, reform of procedure and
improvement of the administration of 'justice, and constitutional law,
where he had to adapt and supplement the great tradition of Cooley
to the exigencies of the complex urban, industrial, society of today.
A word about each of these. He saw clearly that a university law
school had to develop legal education beyond the mere training in
use of the tools of the lawyer's art which was the aim of the apprentice
type of school. He saw that law must be thought of as a specialized
form of social control and studied in relation to all the agencies of
social control, the ends of social control, and the means of attaining
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those ends. Hence there was increased need of research and of publication and of a broader legal scholarship. What he achieved in this
direction you well know.
As to reform of procedure, he was a steadfast advocate of the movement which has led to the overhauling of procedure in so many of
the states in the last two decades and culminated in the Federal Rules
of 1938. He was an effective advocate when advocates were sorely
needed; not, however, goading the bar, as I fear some of us did at
times and many at all times, but speaking and writing persuasively
with clear understanding of the views of the practitioners and the
reasons behind them and full allowance for the difficulties which
stood in the way of acceptance· at once of the proposals of reformers.
I doubt whether the help he gave in bringing about a modem legal
procedure in this country will be appreciated hereafter by those who
write the history of the movement simply from the books and periodicals. The effect of his quiet but persuasive persistence in talking procedural reform to the profession on all occasions is something which is
not in the books and is known only to those who were for a generation
in the thick of the fight.
Those who may some day write the history of American law in
what I venture to think they will recognize as a new formative era,
namely, the twentieth century, are not unlikely to go only upon what
was printed in the beginnings of that era and so miss a great inHuence
which was felt rather than heard. For Dean Bates' output in print
will appear meagre to them. They will not realize that the first dozen
years of his deanship were taken up with a heavy task of reconstruction in addition to the normal load of administrative work which
kept most of the law school deans of that time from the publishing
they would have liked to do and many would have been able to do
otherwise. Then nine years, 1922-1931, were taken up by planning
and supervising the magnificent group of buildings made possible by
the gift of Mr. Cook. From experience of the very much lesser task
of rebuilding and adding to Langdell hall, a task of three years, not
of nine, I know something of how effective such a task, added to the
everyday work of teaching and administration, is to prevent a dean
from writing anything. Then followed eight years of organizing and
planning the research he had foreseen and Mr. Cook's munificence
had made possible. Thus the tale of his deanship is complete, and the
time for productive writing has been wanting.
Going over his writings as they are listed year by year in the
indexes to legal periodicals, Dean Bates' publications fall into three
classes: papers and addresses on legal education, papers and addresses
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on law reform and improvement of the administration of justice, and
writings on constitutional law and the rise of the service state. Notable
in the first category is his brief paper, "The Needs of a Law School,"
(1926) responding to Mr. Cook's magnificent gift. The keynote is:
'We think .of law today ... as an instrument with which we may
work for the social welfare of the race. So considered, law ceases to
be merely a set of rules for the guidance of conduct. Rather it is a
plan of life, reaching down into every phase of human existence."
What is to be remarked in this paper is recognition of the service
state which a decade later came to claim the whole stage, and yet the
balance and sound judgment which enabled him to see it in proportion and perceive also the place of law in our American polity in
enabling our institutions to function with a minimum of friction.
Neither the grip of the ideas in which his generation had been brought
up, which could see only the general security and a state primarily
concerned with maintaining it, nor the momentum of the movement
for an omnicompetent state by which all human needs and even desires
were to be satisfied, could disturb his balanced judgment.
In his paper "Defects in Our Legal System,"1 there is an admirable
discussio:q. of the then prevailing lack of adequate training of the bar
for its immediate tasks. Indeed, the need of adequate educational
requirements for admission to the bar was something he kept hammering upon in the days when this sorely needed urging. Even as late as
1915 in a brief but excellent paper in Case and Commenf (note,
not in a law school periodical but in one sure to reach the element in
the profession which had come from office training or from apprenticetype law schools) he is careful to show the difference between the
office training of a generation before and such training as was possible
in the second decade of this century.
In an address before the Illinois State Bar Association in 19143
he urges the law schools to develop leaders in juristic thought and
shows how procedure has suffered from rule of thumb treatment in
the apprentice-type schools. His feeling for the importance of reaching the practicing profession and apprec:iation of the needs of the
practitioner of which the latter was not always conscious is brought
out in a paper on "Legal Institutes for Practising Lawyers," read before
the section on legal education of the American Bar Association in
1937. It is eminently practical, in the best sense of that much abused
112 MicH. L. R:sv. 167 (1914).
"Should Applicants for Admission to the Bar be Requited to Take a Law School
Course?" 21 CASE AND CoMMBNT 960 (1915).
3 "Law Schools and Reform in Procedure," Pnoc. Ju.. ST. BAR AssN. 399 (1914).
2
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word, in its handling of a subject on which there has been much
wasted writing and speaking. He saw what was needed, what stood
in the way of providing it, and what could be done profitably and what
not. Characteristically unpretentious, it yet says about all that can be
said after there has been a decade of further debate. Nor must I omit
in this connection to note an interesting review of a book, "The Story
of -a County Prosecutor,"4 which shows the appreciation of the facts
of administration of justice which has been so much preached by the
American realists, but with at the same time clear understanding of
how far they tell the whole story, how far they are fundamentally
significant, what may be done about them, and what is inherent and
beyond reach. In this brief review there is more than in many pages
of what has been written about juristic realism.
Passing to the second category, namely, law reform, one must first
notice his address on "Defects in our Legal System"5 before the Michigan Bar Association in 1913. Here, anticipating what was always
thrown at us by the practitioner in those days, he admits that law and
lawyers have always been subjects of attack and that in American
history prejudices brought over from seventeenth-century England
had died out slowly in America and had been for a time intensified
by economic conditions after the revolution. Also he recognized that
much of the then current criticism of law and the administration of
justice was unreasonable and unreasoning. Conceding this, he went
straight to the valid grounds of complaint. One was the condition of
procedure, thoroughly reformed in England a half century before,
but in America still obstructing effective application of the substantive
law. A seco1:1d, he pointed out, was the imperfect organization of
our courts, pointing out in particular the deficiency of provision for
petty cases, which still prevails in too many states, the want of coordination in the higher courts, and the lack of an administrative head
"to give coherence and unity to the activities of the component parts." 6
Third, he·stressed lack of adequate training and inefficiency of the bar
considered collectively. Fourth, he blamed "a certain sentimentality
and a lawlessness on the part of great masses of our people, due to
our political origin, our early history, and perhaps to our national
temperament ...." 7
An especially strong part of this paper treats of organization of
41 MICH. L. RBv. 915 (1943).
Supra, n. I.
6 Id. at 173.
7!d. at 172.

4

5
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courts: expensive and time-consuming multiplied appeals, conflicts
of courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the system of courts of general
jurisdiction of :first instance as "a series of separate compartments and
they in turn divided into sections and then cross sectioned," so that
litigants too easily got in the wrong compartment to their undoing.
He also points out how the ultimate court of review is needlessly burdened by unrestricted access to it so that eight justices had to hear arguments, read briefs and records, and decide a litigation which had
already gone through two courts as to the ownership of a hen turkey.
He discusses also the multiplication of specialized courts and the bad
system of rotating judges. Much of this is still to be corrected in many
states and pressure to multiply courts is always with us. In 1913, before
much had been done to modernize the organization of courts in this
country, it was a timely exposition and much of it will have enduring
value. What is significant, as we look back to the time when it was
read before the state bar association, is that it was read by a law
teacher, speaking to a bar association as one of them urging upon the
practitioners the primary purpose of a bar association, to advance
the administration of justice, to serve. the law, not the lawyers, but
with a mastery of the subject compelling respect, where there had
been too much ill-directed general denunciation and proposals dictated
by enthusiasm with no basis in experience or in knowledge of the real
causes of ills felt but not understood.
On his main interest, constitutional law, he published little. But
his account of Chief Justice Stone, at the time of the latter's appointment as Chief Justice, shows a mastery of the subject as it stood at
the critical time on the eve of our entering the second world war.
His address to the state bar of California as Morrison Foundation
lecturer in 1936, entitled "Trends in American Government," shows
appreciation of the development of the service state, which he had
foreseen a decade before at the dedication of the law club building,
and is a well balanced appraisal of the movement and of the swing
to administration and away from adjudication which it involves. He
shows why complete return to the nineteenth-century idea of the state
is not possible and yet why the carrying out of the service state to its
furthest logical possibilities is equally impossible under our polity. It
is as timely today after the second world war as it was before the overturnings which that war has contributed to bring about. The same
clear insight and balanced judgment may be seen in a review of a book
on the contract clause by a teacher of political science, published in a
Canadian legal periodical in 1929. This should be said also of a review
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of Laski's Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty. 8 He remarks that
"Most of us who must confess to origin in the now much despised Victorian period, are probably not prepared to have the state reduced to
the level of a public-service company...." 9 But reducing it to that level
and giving it a monopoly of all public service, with an all embracing
definition of public service, is not unlikely to elevate it to a higher level
of power. As Dean Bates points out, "The state will never be absolutely
secure and no unsupported theory is likely long to seriously increase or
diminish the germs of conflict and danger which lie in any human
society."10
What stands out in my memory is a natural leader; a sterling character; an attractive but firm personality; a scholar without a scintilla of
_ display, patient except as to trifling by those who should be at earnest
work and as to pretense and pseudo-scholarship and wisecrackery; zealous to make the law school effective toward the advancement of justice
while not neglecting its immediate task of turning out competent lawyers; forgetful of his own fame and putting aside the writing of which
he was entirely capable in order to give first place in his energies to his
tasks as teacher and administrator; withal a true and loyal friend. May
I say of him what I had to say formerly of another dean of like devotion
to his life's work, to justice, and to scholarship, and like strength of
conscience: "In hand and foot and mind foursquare, fashioned without
Haw." Such was the Greek ideal, and such, I say, was Dean Bates.

Roscoe Pound
s 31 ILmv. L. R:Bv. 1171 (1918).
9 Id. at 1173.
10 Ibid.

